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LIST OF PARTIES
Parties in EnerVest v. Utah State Engineer et al.
(Section 24 petition filed Feb 28, 2012)
1. EnerVest, LTD, successor in interest to Bill Barrett Corporation – Appellant
(“EnerVest”)
2. Michael Carlson – Appellee (“Carlson”)
3. Utah State Engineer – Appellee (“State Engineer”)
4. The Willis A. and Wilma Hammerschmid Trust (participated in the district court,
and filed an appeal, but their appeal has been dismissed)
5. Garry and Nancy Motte (participated in the district court, but did not file an
appeal)
6. Leroy Mead (did not actively participate in the district court or file an appeal)
7. KFJ Partnership (did not actively participate in the district court or file an appeal)
8. Iriart Properties, LLC (did not actively participate in the district court or file an
appeal)
9. Richard Calder (did not actively participate in the district court or file an appeal)
This matter, EnerVest v. Utah State Engineer (the “Section 24 Hearing”) comes
to the Court under Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-24, which allows for an expedited resolution
of certain water rights issues within a general water rights adjudication.

Thus, the

Section 24 Hearing is just a subset of the above-captioned In the Matter of the General
Determination of All Rights, both Surface and Underground, within the Drainage Area of
the Uintah Basin (the “General Adjudication”).
The General Adjudication was commenced on March 20, 1956. And in 1964, the
State Engineer’s Office issued the Proposed Determination of Water Rights by the State
Engineer, Nine Mile Creek Division (Code No. 47) (the “Proposed Determination”).
The State Engineer served the Proposed Determination on water claimants within the
Nine Mile Creek Division.

Relevant to this case, four objections to the Proposed

Determination were timely filed in 1964: the Louis Motte Objection, the Amber Keel

ii

Objection, the Iriart-Thayn-Dause Objection, and the Sprouse- Hammerschmid Objection
(collectively the “Objections” with the parties filing the Objections, and their successors,
denoted “Objectors”).

Neither EnerVest, nor its predecessors in interest, filed an

objection.
In 2012, under Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-24, EnerVest’s predecessor sought
expedited resolution of the water ownership issues raised in the Objections. The district
court granted EnerVest’s petition and started the Section 24 Hearing. As claimants to
water from Minnie Maud Creek—and therefore parties that would be “directly affected
by the [Objections],” Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-24(2)—EnerVest and Carlson were also
parties to both the General Adjudication and the Section 24 Hearing.

[See Order

Granting Stipulation to Proceed with Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-24 Petition for an Expedited
Hearing on Objections (“Section 24 Order”), R2 000263, ¶ 2.]
Relevant Parties in the General Adjudication
(Started on March 20, 1956, Objections Filed in 1964, and still ongoing)
1. State Engineer
2. Minnie Maud Reservoir and Irrigation Company (AKA Minnie Maud Irrigation
Company) (“Minnie Maud”)
3. Louis Motte – Objector
4. Amber Keel – Objector
5. Bernard Iriart, Albert Thayn, and William C. Dause – Objectors
6. Clyve and Myrtle Mae Sprouse and Willis and Wilma Hammerschmidt –
Objectors
The full General Adjudication is not on appeal; only the Section 24 Hearing issue
(i.e., the ownership question raised in the Objections) is before this Court. Thus, the full
list of parties for the General Adjudication is irrelevant to this case. Nevertheless, that
list is available in case number 560800056 in the Eighth District Court.
iii

Parties in Davis v. Christensen et al.
(Complaint filed May 3, 1957)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Ernest E. Davis
Minnie Maud
Thomas A. Christensen and Bud Christensen
Louis Motte
Amber Keel
Bernard Iriat
Davis v. Christensen is not before the Court, but is somewhat relevant to decisions

that were made in the Section 24 Hearing. This was a private lawsuit brought in 1957 by
Plaintiff Ernest Davis against Defendants Tom Christensen, Bud Christensen, Louis
Motte, Amber Keel, and Bernard Iriat. Minnie Maud later intervened as co-Plaintiff.
The lawsuit sought an order allocated the water rights at issue in this case, and alleged
that the water rights were owned by Minnie Maud, that water users could only use as
much water as authorized by their number of shares, and that Defendants had been
illegally using water beyond their right. After filing answers and motions, the parties did
not further pursue this case because of the pending General Adjudication.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a summary judgment ruling, [Ruling on the Parties’ CrossMotions for Summary Judgment, R2 001661–78 (the “Ruling”)] that was certified by the
district court as final and appealable under Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b) (2016). [Final Order
and Judgment, R2 001897-88 (Apr. 14, 2016).] 1 This appeal was initially poured over to
the Utah Court of Appeals, but was later recalled.

The Utah Supreme Court has

jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j) (2016).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Whether the district court correctly entered summary judgment confirming the
Proposed Determination’s listing of Minnie Maud as the owner of the water
rights at issue, where Minnie Maud was legally formed in 1902, where the
predecessors of each party to the Section 24 Hearing expressly conveyed by deed
their water rights to Minnie Maud, and where EnerVest failed to present any
evidence that any original shareholders disputed Minnie Maud’s existence.
A district court’s grant of summary judgment is reviewed for correctness. See
Harvey v. Cedar Hills City, 2010 UT 12, ¶ 10, 127 P.3d 256 (citation omitted). This
issue was raised below. [R2 001000-12, 001419-44, 001539-70.]
2. Whether the Court should affirm the district court’s ruling on the alternative
grounds of laches or estoppel.
Laches and estoppel were raised below. [R2 001009-11, 001441-43, 001565-68.]
This Court may affirm a grant of summary judgment upon any ground apparent in the
record. See Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ¶ 10, 52 P.3d 1158.

1

EnerVest’s record on appeal is split across two CDs, each separately paginated.
Disc 1 contains pages 000001 through 004532. Disc 2 contains pages 000001 through
002244. When citing to the Record, Carlson will refer to Disc 1 as “R1” and Disc 2 as
“R2.”
1

3. Whether the Court should affirm the district court’s ruling on the alternative
grounds that: (a) EnerVest lacks appellate standing where no Objector has
appealed rejection of the Objections; or (b) EnerVest has conceded on appeal
that Minnie Maud was a de jure corporation and the undisputed facts establish
that the original shareholders ratified any alleged ultra vires acceptance of title
to the water rights.
These issues were not decided by the trial court. EnerVest’s standing before the
district court is not disputed, and the issue of its appellate standing arose only on the
Objectors’ failing to appeal. Similarly, although EnerVest argued against Minnie Maud’s
de jure status in the district court, EnerVest concedes that status on appeal. [R2 00089192.] This Court may affirm a grant of summary judgment upon any ground apparent in
the record, Bailey, 2002 UT 58, ¶ 10, and standing may be raised at any time, Brown v.
Div. of Water Rights, 2010 UT 14, ¶¶ 12–13, 228 P.3d 747.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In the 1960s, the State Engineer’s office analyzed the water rights on Minnie
Maud Creek 2 and issued the Proposed Determination recommending to the district court
that the Minnie Maud be decreed as owner of water right numbers 90-24, -184 through 191 (inclusive), -196, -197, and -299 (the “Water Rights”) 3. A few local individuals
filed Objections to this conclusion, claiming that Minnie Maud’s shareholders—not their
irrigation company—should be decreed as individual owners of the Water Rights.
EnerVest (who is now the sole remaining champion of the Objections on appeal), asserts

Minnie Maud Creek is a tributary of the Green River located in Nine Mile
Canyon in Carbon and Duchesne Counties about twenty miles northeast of Price, Utah.
3
EnerVest claims ownership over water right numbers 90-24 and 90-196 only,
[see Petition for Section 24 Hr’g, R1 004086, 004195, 004102], with the other Water
Rights split among other users of water from Minnie Maud Creek.
2

2

that a recorded deed conveying the Water Rights to Minnie Maud was void based on an
unsatisfied condition precedent in the Articles and Agreement of Incorporation of the
Minnie Maud Reservoir and Irrigation Company (the “Articles”). In contrast, Carlson,
who succeeded to roughly 60% of Minnie Maud’s shares [R1 004146], argued in favor of
the Proposed Determination. The district court concluded on summary judgment that the
Proposed Determination correctly determined that Minnie Maud held title to the Water
Rights.
Although the following recitation of the facts underlying the Proposed
Determination and the Ruling is somewhat complex, it provides necessary context for the
fairly straightforward legal analysis that follows.
Incorporation of Minnie Maud in 1902
In April 1902, the Water Rights were owned by individuals owning land along
Minnie Maud Creek. 4 These water users, like so many around the State, were “desirous
of associating themselves together for the purpose of constructing, purchasing and
owning water reservoirs, ditches, and canals.” [Articles, R2 000802–07.] Accordingly,
the water users (the incorporators or original shareholders are collectively referred to as
“Incorporators”) organized Minnie Maud. [Id.]
The Articles summarized the intent of the Incorporators, saying “it is intended that
[Minnie Maud] shall succeed to the property rights of [the Incorporators] in the waters
and ditches and canals of Minnie Maud Creek.”
4

[R2 000803.]

The Articles also

A timeline was presented to the district court at the summary judgment hearing
and is part of the supplemental record on appeal. For the Court’s convenience, a copy is
attached as Addendum A.
3

provided that Minnie Maud “does hereby purchase, take, receive, and hold all of the
water rights now held and claimed by the several incorporators . . . together with all
canals, dams, locks, gates and weirs used therewith . . . now owned and claimed by the
individual incorporators hereto.” [R2 000805.] In exchange for these contributions, the
Articles provided that 2,377 shares were issued to the Incorporators. As listed in the
Articles, the Incorporators and their respective interests were as follows:
Incorporator
David Russell
Bracken Lee-per E.C. Lee
Johnston & Son
A.O. Smith
T.F. Housekeeper
J.A. Hamilton
E. Anderson
Alonzo Kelger
Total

Number of Shares
227
1202
256
143
260
68
39
182
2377

[R2 000802.] The Articles also include the following provision: “[t]his corporation shall
not be effective for any of the purposes mentioned herein until at least 3,000 shares of the
unpaid portion of the capital stock shall have been subscribed.”

[R2 000806.]

Notwithstanding that provision, the Incorporators filed for and received a certificate of
incorporation for Minnie Maud (the “Certificate”). [R2 001449, attached hereto as
Addendum B.] The Articles and the Certificate were filed with the Carbon County
Clerk and the Utah Secretary of State. [Id.]
As noted by the district court, “‘Right after the company was organized, all the
water users on Minnie Maud Creek went to work with hand tools, teams and scrapers to
build the reservoir up Minnie Maud Canyon . . . .’” [Ruling, at R2 001664 (quoting the

4

Anderson Aff., R2 00843-44, attached hereto as Addendum C).] Then, about six weeks
after Minnie Maud was incorporated, each of the Incorporators (and other affiliated
parties) executed a formal deed (the “Deed”) that conveyed “unto [Minnie Maud] and its
assigns forever,” “all their and each of their rights and claims of every kind and nature
whatsoever in and to the waters of Minnie Maud Creek . . . .” [R2 001447, attached
hereto as Addendum D.]
Over a series of decades, the Incorporators or their successors-in-interest took
many actions that treated Minnie Maud as a valid corporation that owned the Water
Rights. Soon after formation, the Incorporators appointed a board of directors, which
held meetings, appointed a water master, and levied assessments. [Minutes, R2 000909913, 001454-58 (indicating the board appointed J.C. Johnston, one of the Incorporators,
and EnerVest’s likely predecessor in interest, as water master for $100 per year), attached
hereto as Addendum E.]5 The Incorporators constructed, maintained, and used water
delivery structures, including a reservoir in which they stored the water from Minnie
Maud Creek, which remained in service until it washed out around 1911 or 1913.
[Addendum D, R2 000843-44, 000988, 001664.] From 1903 to 1905, Minnie Maud,
seeking to protect the interests of its shareholders in the Water Rights, initiated a lawsuit
against a nearby water user (Martha Grames) “to determine and quiet its right to the

5

The record contains conflicting testimony about whether a water master was ever
appointed. [Compare Anderson Aff., Addendum D, at R2 000843-44 (claiming no
knowledge of a water master) with Minutes, Addendum E, at R2 000909 (appointing a
water master).] But even assuming no water master, the undisputed facts establish that
the Incorporators treated Minnie Maud as a valid entity that owned the Water Rights.

5

waters of Minnie Maud creek, . . . and to enjoin [Martha Grames] from interfering with,
or from diverting or using, or asserting any rights to the use of [water from Minnie Maud
Creek].” Minnie Maud Res. & Irr. Co. v. Grames, 81 P. 893, 893 (Utah 1905); [R2
001043-47.]6

And between 1902 and 1955, the Incorporators and their successor

shareholders held and took record of corporate meetings. [Addendum E, R2 000909-913,
001454-58, 001664.]
The Davis v. Christensen Lawsuit in 1957
In 1957—more than five decades after Minnie Maud was incorporated and after
all the Incorporators had passed away or otherwise conveyed their land and shares of
stock—a dispute arose between Ernest E. Davis, then-president of Minnie Maud, and
some of Minnie Maud’s then-shareholders. Mr. Davis filed a private lawsuit, Davis v.
Christensen, asserting that the other water users were using more than their proportionate
share of the Water Rights.

[See R1 004118-23.]

The Complaint listed the share

ownership at that time, which is consistent with the Incorporators’ original shares:
New Shareholder
Ernest E. Davis, Jr.
Thomas Christensen
Bud Christensen
T.F. Housekeeper
Louis Motte
Bernard Iriat
Amber Keel
Total

Predecessor(s)
Russell (227) & Lee (1202)
Johnston (256) & Smith (143) ÷ 2
Johnston (256) & Smith (143) ÷ 2
T.F. Housekeeper
Hamilton
Anderson
Kelger

6

Number of Shares
1429
199½
199½
260
68
39
182
2377

The Grames court confirmed Ms. Grames’ ownership of the right to use water
from Minnie Maud Creek, but it also confirmed that Minnie Maud owned the remainder
of the rights. [See R2 1304-05]; see also Minnie Maud Res., 81 P. at 894. No party or
witness questioned Minnie Maud’s existence. See id.
6

[See R1 004118.] The Davis defendants answered the complaint and argued that “by
reason of the fact that 3,000 shares of stock have never been subscribed [by Minnie
Maud], neither these defendants nor their predecessors have ever recognized the validity
of [Minnie Maud] or its right to exercise any corporate powers.” [See R2 000355-62,
000364-70, 001317-22.] These filings are the first instance in the record of anyone
claiming that the organization and operation of Minnie Maud was somehow invalid.
The 1957 Davis case did not proceed to trial because, as noted in the next section,
a parallel litigation—the General Adjudication—arose at about the same time and was
ultimately better equipped to address ownership and proper use of the Water Rights. 7
Commencement of the General Adjudication
The General Adjudication traces its origin to July 31, 1950, when a group of water
users (unrelated to the facts of this case), filed a petition with the State Engineer to
resolve water rights associated with an unrelated body of water. [R1 000013.] The State
Engineer decided that to properly administer those water rights, it needed to consider all
water rights in the full Green River and Uintah basin—which included Minnie Maud
Creek.

[See R1 000013-15.]

The district court agreed, and on March 20, 1956,

authorized the General Adjudication. [R1 000022-24.] 8

7

The Davis case is not before this Court. It is referenced here simply to give
context because EnerVest relies on this case to support its arguments on appeal. (See
Aplt. Br. at 11-12 & nn.7-9, 38 & n.21.)
8

General adjudications of water rights are extensive, scientifically intensive, and
often last for decades. The history of this particular General Adjudication is complex,
including various relocations, renamings, divisions, and renumberings. This history was
7

The State Engineer sent notices and summonses to all water users in the area and
began compiling data and surveys of the land and water, as well as correspondence from
the water users. [See R2 001016-17.] Many water users, including Mr. Davis, Minnie
Maud, and the Christensens (predecessors to EnerVest), were identified and became
parties to the General Adjudication. [Cf. R2 001018-31.] The Water Rights were also
identified as some of the many water rights that would be adjudicated. [Cf. id.]
On August 1, 1962, apparently pursuant to the General Adjudication, Thomas A.
Christensen—an EnerVest predecessor—wrote a letter to the State Engineer
acknowledging that Minnie Maud had elected officers and issued stock. [R1 004130,
attached hereto as Addendum F.] He identified himself as an officer, and went on to
identify himself and his brother (Bud Christensen) as Minnie Maud shareholders. [Id.] 9
He also identified Mr. Davis as the President of Minnie Maud.

[Id.]

His list of

shareholders was consistent with that recited in Mr. Davis’s 1957 Complaint. [See id.]
The Proposed Determination and Objections
In March, 1964, after years of work in the General Adjudication, the State
Engineer issued his Proposed Determination of how the district court should rule
regarding the ownership and extent of the various water rights. [R2 001018-31.] The
Proposed Determination identified Minnie Maud as the owner of the Water Rights. [Id.]
expertly summarized by the State Engineer in the district court below. [See MIS of State
Engineer’s Mot. to Determine Scope of Sec. 24 Hr’g, R2 000287-288 n.1.]
9

The letter stated that “Following is a list of Officers of Minnie Maud Irrigation
Co. . . . T.A. Christensen (Director),” and that “Following is a list of Stockholders and the
amount owned by each . . . . T.A. Christensen 199 1/2 (shares). . . Bud Christensen 199
1/2 (shares). . . .” [Id. (alterations to ditto marks).]
8

It further expressly rejected any claims by the landowners that they owned the Water
Rights in their individual capacity. [See R2 001032.]
Pursuant to Utah law—which requires all water claimants to file within 90 days
any objections to a proposed determination 10—the Objectors filed four separate
Objections urging that they, as opposed to Minnie Maud, owned some of the Water
Rights. [R2 001052-66.] The Objectors included only some of the defendants in the
1957 Davis case.

Specifically, the Hammerschmids (who succeeded to T.F.

Housekeeper’s position), filed an Objection in connection with the Sprouses, an
intermediate predecessor. Similarly, Louis Motte, Bernard Iriat, and Amber Keel each
filed Objections.
The Christensens’ interests—the interests under which EnerVest now asserts
ownership of some of the Water Rights—were not included in any of the Objections.
[See Section 24 Order, R2 000262-65, attached hereto as Addendum G.]

Indeed,

EnerVest stipulated and the district court concluded that “EnerVest and Michael
Carlson’s predecessors in interest did not file Objections objecting to the Proposed
Determination,” but they would nevertheless be permitted to participate in the Section 24
Hearing “because they are claimants to the use of water and have a direct interest in the
issues raised in the . . . Objections.” [Id. at 00263]; see also Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-24.
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The current statute is Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-11(2) (2016), which requires all
claimants to file an objection within 90 days of the Proposed Determination. The version
in effect at the time the Objectors filed their Objections was essentially the same,
including the 90-day requirement. See Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-11 (1953).
9

Post-Objection Period
After more than sixty years, the General Adjudication is still ongoing. 11 In the
meantime, Minnie Maud was eventually involuntarily dissolved by the State in
November 1974, but it was never “wound up” as a business. [See R2 001068.] In 2000,
Carlson purchased the ranch land previously owned by Mr. Davis along with all
associated water rights, which specifically included 1,429 shares in Minnie Maud. [See
R2 000956-60.] Similarly, in 2006, EnerVest’s immediate predecessor, the Bill Barrett
Corporation (“Barrett”), purchased the lands and water interests previously held by the
Christensens. The relevant land and water interests of the Objectors likewise changed
hands during this period.
The Section 24 Petition and Scope
In 2012, Barrett sought for an expedited consideration of the Water Rights by
filing a petition for review under Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-24. [R1 004085-107.] That
section allows district courts to address smaller portions of the General Adjudications and
resolve any outstanding objections in an expedited procedure. See Utah Code Ann. § 734-24. These mini-cases—or section 24 hearings—help resolve discrete objections and
provide clarity to water users, even though the General Adjudication is ongoing and no
final, overarching court decree has been entered. Under Section 24, a “claimant to the

11

This is a common pattern in general adjudications, because they cover such a
large area, involve so many participants, include many water rights, and state and judicial
resources are limited. Indeed, at some point in this General Adjudication, the original
record was lost, and in 1979, had to be reconstituted from the records of the Attorney
General and State Engineer. [See R1 004098.]
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use of water” 12 in a General Adjudication “may petition the court to expedite the hearing
of a valid, timely objection to a report and proposed determination.” Id. § 73-4-24(1)
(emphasis added).
Based on its status as a water claimant, on February 28, 2012, Barrett filed the
Section 24 Petition, asking the district court to expeditiously hear and resolve the
Objections. [R1 004086, 004091, 004103.] Barrett argued that Minnie Maud was not the
correct owner of the Water Rights because it had failed to meet the 3,000-share provision
in the Articles, and therefore the irrigation company never existed and was not authorized
to receive ownership of the Water Rights. [R1 004102.] Barrett also asked the district
court for declaratory judgment and quiet title in favor of Barrett on the some of the Water
Rights, even though those water rights were not covered by the original Objections.
(Soon thereafter, EnerVest acquired Barrett for $375.1 million and took over the
litigation.) [See R2 000453, 460-61.]
The State Engineer, however, opposed the scope of EnerVest’s Section 24
Petition. As noted by the State Engineer in the district court below, “Section 24 is a
unique and rarely invoked component of the adjudication statute,” and due to the lack of
12

A water “claimant” is not expressly defined by Utah’s water statute. See
generally, Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-1-1 to 73-30-202. It is, however, impliedly broader
than an “objector,” because every water user who is part of a general adjudication is a
“claimant,” whereas only those claimants that timely file an objection to a proposed
determination are “objectors.” Compare id. § 73-4-1(1)(a) (allowing a group of water
users to request an investigation “of the rights of all claimants to the water of” a given
water source) and id. § 73-4-3(2) to (4) (directing the State Engineer to search for and
serve summons upon “all possible claimants” of water when initiating a general
adjudication), with id. § 73-4-11(2) (allowing any “claimant who desires to object to the
state engineer’s proposed determination shall, within 90 days . . ., file a written
objection”).
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much guidance in the case law, the State Engineer filed a motion asking the district court
to determine the scope of the Section 24 hearing to assist the parties in framing the issues.
[MIS of State Engineer’s Mot. to Determine Scope of Sec. 24 Hr’g, R2 000290.] The
State Engineer argued that the district court should limit the Section 24 hearing to
resolving the Objections that were timely filed in 1964, and not allow EnerVest to expand
the process into updating ownership to the present (via quiet title and declaratory
judgment). Updating the Water Rights beyond the time the 1964 Objections were filed is
outside the bounds of the General Adjudication statutes. [Reply, R2 000427.]
The district court agreed, and ordered that the Section 24 hearing would be limited
to “the issues timely raised in the 1964 Objections,” which the district court “generally
restated” as “whether the [Proposed Determination] was correct to list [Minnie Maud] as
the owner of [the Water Rights].” [R2 000477-79.]
Procedural History in the Section 24 Hearing
The parties that participated in the Section 24 Hearing were the State Engineer,
Carlson, EnerVest, and two successors to the original Objectors, the Mottes and the
Hammerschmid Trust. The other successors to the Objectors and users of water from
Minnie Maud Creek were given notice of the proceeding, but they elected not to actively
participate.

After conducting extensive discovery, Carlson, EnerVest, and the

Hammerschmid Trust brought dueling summary judgment motions to resolve the sole
issue before the district court—whether the Proposed Determination correctly listed
Minnie Maud as owner of the Water Rights.
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EnerVest moved for summary judgment, arguing first that Minnie Maud never
existed because it had failed to comply with the laws of incorporation (either as a de jure
or de facto corporation). [R2 000891-93.] It further argued that because Minnie Maud
issued only 2,377 shares, it was never authorized to accept delivery of the Deed
conveying the Water Rights. [R2 000894-96.] The Hammerschmids also moved for
summary judgment, raising similar arguments. [R2 000798.] (Although the Mottes did
not move for summary judgment, they raised similar arguments in their briefing
responding to Carlson’s summary judgment motion.) [R2 001371.]
Carlson cross-moved for summary judgment, arguing that even though Minnie
Maud only issued 2,377 shares, the original Incorporators had waived any requirement
that additional shares be issued, and the Objectors, as successors to the Incorporators,
were therefore barred from relying on that 3,000-share provision more than 55 years
later. [R2 1004-11.]
The district court issued its Ruling resolving all the pending summary judgment
motions. [R2 001661-78.] The Ruling identified the undisputed facts. [R2 001661-67.]
Based on these undisputed facts, the court concluded that Minnie Maud had been brought
into existence as a properly formed “de jure” corporation. [R2 001661-67.] The district
court reasoned, however, that even though Minnie Maud existed as a corporate entity, it
had not been duly authorized to receive property because the 3,000-share threshold had
not yet been met. [R2 001670-71.]
The district court nevertheless concluded that the undisputed documents and
conduct in the evidence demonstrated as a matter of law that the Incorporators had
13

waived the 3,000-share provision.

[R2 001673-74.]

The court based its decision

primarily on the Deed [Addendum D, R2 001447], noting that this was enough to
establish that the Incorporators, knowing of the 3,000-share provision, nevertheless chose
to ignore it and treat Minnie Maud as if it had the authority to own the Water Rights. [R2
001674 (“The Court finds that the shareholders’ act of executing and delivering a deed of
the Water Rights to Minnie Maud demonstrates the shareholders’ clear intention of
waiving performance of a condition precedent and treating the agreement as in effect.”).]
EnerVest’s appeal seeks only the reversal of the portion of the Ruling granting
Carlson’s summary judgment motion. (Aplt. Br. at 15 & 43 (“Summary judgment based
on the Deed alone was error and should be reversed.”).) EnerVest has NOT asked this
Court to reverse the district court’s denial of its motion. (See generally id.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
EnerVest seeks to overturn the Ruling on the grounds that the district court did not
properly view the facts in the light most favorable to EnerVest, and that the result of the
decision is now at odds with the Proposed Determination.

These arguments fail,

however, because the district court correctly took the undisputed facts and all the
inferences reasonably flowing therefrom on the evidentiary record in the light most
favorable to EnerVest, and nevertheless concluded as a matter of law that the Proposed
Determination correctly identified Minnie Maud as the owner of the Water Rights.
Moreover, EnerVest’s assertion that the Ruling creates inconsistency within the Proposed
Determination is an unpreserved red herring and an improper expansion of the Section 24
Hearing. This Court should affirm.
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Argument I: EnerVest lacks standing to pursue this appeal because none of the
Objectors appealed, and EnerVest cannot simply adopt the rights of an objector on
appeal. Objections to a Proposed Determination are carefully circumscribed by statute,
and EnerVest and its predecessors admittedly did not file a timely objection. EnerVest’s
statutory right to initiate a Section 24 Hearing as a claimant does not also grant it the
rights and powers conferred to Objectors. And where no Objector has appealed the
Ruling, EnerVest is by this appeal attempting, despite the objection deadline having
expired more than fifty years ago, to file its own objection to the Proposed
Determination. Furthermore, even if EnerVest has standing to bring this appeal, it has
conceded that Minnie Maud existed as a corporation. Therefore, Minnie Maud’s claimed
nonexistence—the only basis on which EnerVest argues the invalidity of the deed—
cannot be sustained. The deed to Minnie Maud was not void. Minnie Maud’s acceptance
of title was, at most, an ultra vires act that was ratified by the Incorporators.
Argument II: Even setting aside EnerVest’s lack of standing and its concessions,
the district court correctly found the Incorporators waived the 3,000-share provision of
the Articles. The undisputed facts, even when viewed in the light most favorable to
EnerVest, support no other reasonable conclusion. After filing the Articles and obtaining
a certificate of incorporation, the Incorporators constructed a reservoir as contemplated
by the Articles, they signed a Deed expressly conveying the Water Rights to Minnie
Maud, they prosecuted a lawsuit and appeal in the name of Minnie Maud as owner of the
Water Rights, and they participated in corporate governance and formalities. Indeed,
neither EnerVest nor any other party has pointed to any admissible evidence that the
15

Incorporators ever challenged Minnie Maud’s existence or ownership of the Water
Rights. To the contrary, EnerVest’s own predecessor affirmatively represented to the
State that Minnie Maud existed and had officers and shareholders. As such, the district
court correctly ascertained the undisputed facts in the record and any reasonable
inferences therefrom, and did not err in refusing the speculations or unsupportable
inferences proposed by EnerVest.
Argument III:

EnerVest’s argument that the summary judgment ruling is

inconsistent with the Proposed Determination should be rejected because EnerVest failed
to preserve this argument below. And even if it had preserved the issue, EnerVest’s
argument misappraises the result of Minnie Maud’s ownership. Although many water
right owners also own the land on which the water is authorized for use, there are plenty
of examples in which ownership of the water right is separate and distinct from
ownership of the land.
Argument IV: The district court’s grant of summary judgment can also be
affirmed on two additional bases that the district court did not reach. Because EnerVest’s
predecessors did not dispute Minnie Maud’s existence or ownership of the Water Rights
from 1902 to 1957, and Carlson and his predecessors relied on Minnie Maud’s existence
and their associated stock ownership to buy and sell their property, the doctrines of laches
and estoppel bar EnerVest from now claiming that Minnie Maud never existed.
ARGUMENT
The Proposed Determination correctly identified Minnie Maud as the owner of the
Water Rights because the undisputed evidence presented to the district court uniformly
16

and unequivocally demonstrates that the original Incorporators: (1) treated Minnie Maud
as a valid and existing corporation; (2) employed that corporate form in protecting their
collective water interests from third-party threats; and (3) actually executed a Deed
conveying the Water Rights to Minnie Maud. Indeed, neither EnerVest nor the other
parties in the district court presented any evidence that the original Incorporators—as
opposed to their successors more than 50 years later—ever challenged Minnie Maud’s
existence based on its issuance of only 2,377 shares. 13
Accordingly, the Court should affirm the Ruling because, as further discussed
below: (I) EnerVest either lacks standing to appeal or has conceded the dispositive issue
on appeal; (II) the Ruling correctly determined that the Incorporators waived any
requirement that additional shares be issued such that Minnie Maud received title to the
Water Rights; (III) EnerVest’s assertion that the district court’s ruling is inconsistent with
the Proposed Determination is an improper attempt to expand the scope of the Section 24
Hearing and was never raised below; and (IV) the equitable doctrines of laches and
estoppel bar any challenge to Minnie Maud’s existence.

13

Because discovery is complete on the issue of ownership [see R2 000465], and
because EnerVest and the other parties were obliged to provide any such evidence both in
discovery and to establish any factual dispute on summary judgment, see Utah R. Civ.
Proc. 26, 33, and 56, the Court may properly conclude that there is no admissible
evidence that the original Incorporators ever disputed Minnie Maud’s existence.
17

I.

ENERVEST LACKS STANDING TO APPEAL AND HAS CONCEDED
THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE OF MINNIE MAUD’S EXISTENCE
EnerVest raises multiple arguments on appeal, but this Court need not reach those

arguments because, as further discussed below, EnerVest lacks standing to pursue this
appeal and has conceded the dispositive issue of Minnie Maud’s corporate existence.
A. EnerVest Lacks Standing to Appeal Where No Objector Has Appealed
Although there was no question that EnerVest had standing to initiate the Section
24 Hearing with the purpose of resolving the Objections in the district court, EnerVest’s
standing was limited to its rights as a water “claimant.” If the Objectors had withdrawn
their Objections in the district court, EnerVest would be wholly powerless to argue the
Objections’ efficacy. Likewise, because no Objector is appealing the district court’s
rejection of their Objections, EnerVest no longer has any Objection to support.
The State legislature created the water rights adjudication statutes nearly a century
ago. In 1919, the legislature passed the first modern version of the framework governing
water rights. See Laws 1919, pp. 177-203, §§ 1-80. That framework remains mostly
unchanged: generally speaking, after the court initiates a general adjudication of water
rights, the State Engineer is tasked with surveying the area, locating all possible water
claimants, and submitting a proposed determination of water rights to the court.
Compare id. with Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-1 to -24. Water claimants then have ninety
days to file an objection. Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-11(2). The general adjudication,

18

however, is not concluded until all objections are resolved. 14 This means that general
adjudications, which can have hundreds of objections, often take decades before a final
decree can be issued. See, e.g., In re Gen. Determination of Rights to Use of Water of
Price and Green Rivers, 2008 UT 25, 182 P.3d 362 (ongoing since 1956); In re Gen.
Determination of Rights to Use of All Water, Both Surface & Underground, Within
Drainage Area of Utah Lake & Jordan River in Utah, Salt Lake, Davis, Summit,
Wasatch, Sanpete & Juab Ctys. in Utah, 1999 UT 39, 982 P.2d 65 (ongoing since 1944).
Recognizing that general adjudications sometimes span decades, any water
“claimant” in a general adjudication has the right to petition the court to take smaller
portions of general adjudications and resolve any outstanding objections in an expedited
procedure. See Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-24. These section 24 hearings help resolve
discrete objections and provide clarity to water users, even though the General
Adjudication is ongoing and no final, overarching court decree has been entered. Under
section 24, a “claimant to the use of water” need not have been an objector to initiate an
expedited hearing; it only need show it “has a direct interest” in the resolution of the
objection. Id. § 73-4-24(1).
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This rule is clear and has been since the beginning: “[i]f no contest on the part
of any claimant shall have been filed, the court shall render judgment in accordance with
such proposed determination . . . .” Laws 1919, c. 67, §§ 32-33 (emphasis added)
(codified in R.S. 1933, § 100-4-11 & -12.) That requirement remains unchanged to this
day. Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-12 (2016). Thus, as soon as there is no timely objection
before the court, “the court shall render judgment” in favor of the proposed
determination. Id.
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The statute does not expressly define a claimant’s standing during a Section 24
Hearing in the district court, and it does not expressly indicate whether a non-objecting
claimant can seek an appeal. But an examination of the adjudication statute as a whole
together with general legal principles circumscribes standing at both stages. 15 Moreover,
EnerVest’s standing on appeal is not dependent on “injury, nexus, or redressability, but
party status.

Thus, to be legally eligible—or in this sense to have standing—to

participate in certain proceedings, a person or entity must also qualify as a proper party.”
State v. Brown, 2014 UT 48, ¶ 15 n.2, 342 P.3d 239, 242 n.2 (emphasis in original).
Section 24 hearings are not a second bite at the apple. They are merely an
expedited hearing of all objections that were timely filed. Thus, although claimants have
a right to spur action on the timely objections, Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-24(1), they
themselves lack standing to bring new objections or to inject new issues, see id. § 73-411(2). Their standing is limited to the initiation of the hearing in the district court, and
only piggybacks on the objectors that timely filed their objections to the proposed
determination within “90 days.” Id. § 73-4-11(2).
Claimants are not the same as objectors under the statute. Objectors are water
claimants who have met the statutory requirement to file their objections to proposed
15

This Court has used a similar approach when evaluating a related statute, the
Water Conservancy Act, 17a-2-1401 to -1454 (repealed May 6, 2002). See Washington
Cty. Water Cons. Dist. v. Morgan, 2003 UT 58, ¶¶ 7-10, 82 P.3d 1125, 1128. In
Washington County, this Court noted that although conservancy districts were directed to
serve the public’s interest in the administration of water, the structure of the statute in
question did not give rise to an implied statutory standing to seek forfeiture of private
water rights. Id.; see also Rupp v. Moffo, 2015 UT 71, ¶ 9, 358 P.3d 1060, 1062
(concluding a creditor had “statutory standing” under United States Bankruptcy Code, in
part, because of the structure and language in the code).
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determination within “90 days.” Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-11(2). The ninety-day threshold
is applied rigorously under the statute, and has been since its inception. For example, in
United States Fuel Co. v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., the San Rafael general
adjudication was started in 1950. 2003 UT 49, ¶ 3, 79 P.3d 945. The State Engineer took
thirty years to survey the water rights in the area, and issued the proposed determination
on December 1, 1982. Id. Claimant United States Fuel (“USF”) filed its objection
“ninety-one days later.” Id. ¶ 4. The Court recognized that “USF filed an objection one
day late,” but it went on to hold that “[i]ts tardiness had consequences. Unless and until
USF sought and obtained leave of court in the general adjudication to excuse its tardy
objection, [the other water user] was entitled to judgment perfecting the state engineer's
proposed award . . . .” Id. ¶ 17. The Court noted “if the claimant makes no objection, he,
by his silence, confesses the statements contained in the engineer’s proposed
determination of his water rights, and thus a judgment may legally be entered in
accordance with the proposed determination of the engineer.” Id. ¶ 19 (quotation marks
and alterations omitted); see also Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 2003 UT 50, ¶ 32, 84
P.3d 1134, 1145 (noting the water claimant in that case has “long acquiesced” to the
proposed determination because it had failed to file a timely objection).
It is undisputed that neither EnerVest nor its “predecessors in interest . . . file[d]
Objections objecting to the Proposed Determination.” [Addendum G, R2 000263.] As
such, EnerVest’s ability to participate in the Section 24 Hearing was dependent on the

21

fate of the Objections that were timely filed by the Objectors. 16 EnerVest’s silence in
1964 is deemed as having “confess[ed] the statements contained in the engineer’s
proposed determination.” United States Fuel, 2003 UT 49, ¶ 19.
None of the Objectors have pursued their Objections on appeal.

As such,

EnerVest has no ability to ride the Objectors’ coattails to an appeal that no Objector filed.
Said differently, EnerVest cannot be the sole appellant challenging a decision confirming
the Proposed Determination because EnerVest never filed an objection and is presumed
to have agreed with the Proposed Determination. “A claimant who fails to file a timely
objection to the proposed determination demonstrates acquiescence to the state engineer’s
delineation of water rights.” 17 In re Gen. Determination of Rights to Use All of Water,
Both Surface & Underground, Within Drainage Area of Utah Lake & Jordan River in
Utah, Salt Lake, Davis, Summit, Wasatch, Sanpete, & Juab Ctys., 2004 UT 67, ¶ 22, 98
P.3d 1, 6. Thus, EnerVest’s appeal fails because it lacks statutory standing.

16

The statutory framework for adjudicating water rights allows any “claimant to
the use of water” to ask the district court to “expedite the hearing of a valid, timely
objection.” Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-24(1). That section, however, confers the standing to
expedite timely filed objections only; it does not confer standing to then prosecute the
objections throughout the rest of the potential judicial process, such as appeals. The
standing to do so is dependent on the original objector’s, or its successor in interest’s
continued prosecution of that objection. In that sense, a non-objecting claimant in a
Section 24 Hearing (e.g., EnerVest) acts more like an amicus than a party.
17

Of course, a water claimant that did not object to a proposed determination may
appeal a district court decree different from the proposed determination. In that instance,
a non-objector water claimant’s appeal is consistent with its position throughout the
adjudication process, and the claimant would merely be championing the determination
of its rights as presented in the proposed determination.
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B. EnerVest Has Not Challenged the Legal Existence of Minnie Maud
In its Appellate Brief, EnerVest concedes that the Incorporators “complied with
the law” in filing the Articles, that the Articles “‘contain the statement of facts required
by law, and that said corporation is hereby constituted a body corporate.’” (Aplt. Brief at
17–18 (quoting R2 1449).) But EnerVest also uses language that might be read as an
assertion that Minnie Maud had a “conditional existence,” and that the Incorporators
“failed [their] attempt to incorporate Minnie Maud.” (Aplt. Br. at 2, 13; see also id. at
14; id. at 22 (“Minnie Maud’s very existence and power to function . . . were expressly
conditioned on the Share Requirement.”).)
Nevertheless, at no point in its appeal did EnerVest specifically challenge the
district court’s conclusion that Minnie Maud was validly formed as a de jure corporation.
(See generally, id.) Rather, EnerVest admits that “[t]he form of the corporation was
complete, but its substantive operation, its prospective function, its power, and the
obligations of the contracting parties, were not.” (Id. at 25 (emphasis in original).) Thus,
EnerVest has conceded Minnie Maud’s creation as a de jure corporation because
“‘[i]ssues not briefed by an appellant are deemed waived and abandoned.’” Rukavina v.
Triatlantic Ventures, Inc., 931 P.2d 122, 125 (Utah 1997) (quoting Am. Towers Ass’n Inc.
v. CCI Mechanical Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1185 n. 5 (Utah 1996))); see also Allen v. Friel,
2008 UT 56, ¶ 7, 194 P.3d 903 (“If an appellant fails to allege specific errors of the lower
court, the appellate court will not seek out errors in the lower court’s decision.”).
Accordingly, in contrast to EnerVest’s arguments before the district court that
Minnie Maud was neither a de jure nor de facto corporation, EnerVest now seeks to draw
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a fine distinction between Minnie Maud’s legal existence and Minnie Maud’s ability to
act under the terms of its Articles. But to the extent that such a distinction could even be
made, Minnie Maud’s mere corporate existence is dispositive in favor of the Ruling.
Foundational to EnerVest’s case is the principle that “entities that do not exist . . .
cannot own anything.” (Aplt. Brief at 22 (citing Sharp v. Riekhof, 747 P.2d 1044, 1046
(Utah 1987).) But EnerVest cites no support for the proposition that a deed to a de jure
corporation is void. Rather, Minnie Maud’s acceptance and recording of the Deed was,
at most, an ultra vires act that was voidable under Utah law. See Ockey v. Lehmer, 2008
UT 37, ¶ 18, 189 P.3d 51 (holding ultra vires deed from trustees voidable rather than
void). Indeed, the Ockey Court held that a deed from trustees of a terminated trust, where
the trustees “lacked . . . authority[,]” was merely voidable, not void. Id. ¶¶ 17–24.
Further, this Court has unequivocally held that a deed is “void ab initio” only if it violates
public policy. Id.; see also Bank of America v. Adamson, 2017 UT 2, ¶ 21; ___ P.3d ___
(“This court has recognized only one kind of deed as void ab initio; i.e., a deed that
violates public policy.” (italics in original)). And a voidable Deed is “valid against the
world, including the grantor, because only the injured party has standing to ask the court
to set it aside.” Ockey, 2008 UT 37, ¶ 18.
Applying these principles to the Minnie Maud Deed, EnerVest has not argued, nor
could it, that the Deed is void because it somehow violated public policy. Rather, the
Incorporators—the only parties that had standing to enforce any requirement that Minnie
Maud needed to issue additional shares—were the only parties potentially injured by
Minnie Maud issuing only 2,377 shares. And just like the trust beneficiary in Ockey, who
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“signed a document directing the trustees to” execute the deed and who accepted the
benefits from the conveyance, id. ¶ 27, the Incorporators actually signed the Deed and
accepted the benefits of Minnie Maud ownership. Accordingly, the Incorporators ratified
Minnie Maud’s acceptance of the Deed even though accepting title might have otherwise
been considered an ultra vires act. Alternatively, as discussed in greater detail in Part IV
below, the grantors and their successors are at the very least estopped from seeking to set
aside the Deed. Id. ¶ 22 (“By the great weight of authority it is well recognized that there
is a distinction between an illegal or void contract and one merely ultra vires, which
could become enforceable by ratification or estoppel.” (internal quotation marks and
alterations omitted))
EnerVest nevertheless asserts that the Incorporators were merely “start[ing] to
comply with the Articles and the Share Requirement” when they executed the Deed.
(Aplt. Br. at 14.) This assertion is speculative at best. If EnerVest were correct that the
Deed was void, and if the Incorporators are imputed to know and understand what
EnerVest alleges to be the law, then the Incorporators’ actions—filing for and obtaining a
certificate of incorporation that was also in the public record [Addendum C, R2 001449],
knowingly executing a purportedly void Deed to Minnie Maud “and its assigns
forever” [Addendum D, R2 001447], recording it in the public record [id.], participating
in court proceedings extending to the Utah Supreme Court on the basis of the Deed,
and leaving those records unmodified and unchallenged for over half a century—would
be the height of duplicity. This is not the case. The only reasonable and plausible
inference to be
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gained from the Deed is that the Incorporators intended for Minnie Maud to exist and to
take ownership of the Water Rights, even though only 2,377 shares were issued.
Therefore, given EnerVest’s concession on appeal that Minnie Maud was a de jure
corporation, the Court has more than adequate grounds on the record to affirm the district
court’s grant of summary judgment on the basis that the Deed was, at most, voidable as
an ultra vires act, but the Incorporators by their actions and silence ratified Minnie
Maud’s acceptance of the Deed.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY FOUND WAIVER ON THE
UNDISPUTED FACTS
Even if the Court were to conclude that EnerVest has standing to pursue this

appeal and has not conceded the dispositive issue on appeal, affirmance of the Ruling is
nevertheless warranted because the district court correctly found the Incorporators had
waived the 3,000-share provision of the Articles.
It is well settled that the Articles of Incorporation of a corporation form the basis
of a contract, among others, between the corporation and its stockholders.” Fower v.
Provo Bench Canal & Irr. Co., 99 Utah 267, 101 P.2d 375, 376 (1940) And, “[p]arties to
a written contract have the right to modify, waive, or make new contractual terms . . .
even despite the presence of express contractual language to the contrary.” Glenn v.
Reese, 2009 UT 80, ¶ 23, 225 P.3d 185, 191 (quotations and citation omitted). “Waiver
of a contractual right occurs when a party to a contract intentionally acts in a manner
inconsistent with its contractual rights, and, as a result, prejudice accrues to the opposing
party or parties to the contract.” Meadow Valley Contractors, Inc. v. State Dep’t of
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Transp., 2011 UT 35, ¶ 45, 266 P.3d 671, 682–83 (quotations omitted).
EnerVest focuses its argument on the summary judgment standard, noting that
because the deed conveying the Water Rights to Minnie Maud in 1902 “did not expressly
waive anything, the district court had to infer waiver.” (Aplt. Br. at 26.) EnerVest also
argues that the district court “overlook[e]d other plausible, conflicting inferences.” (Id. at
27.) But EnerVest cannot point to any admissible evidence that the original Incorporators
challenged Minnie Maud’s ownership on any basis, including the 3,000-share provision
of the Articles. Instead, the Deed shows that the Incorporators had an intent to convey
the Water Rights to Minnie Maud, and the Incorporators’ undisputed actions that
followed were inconsistent with the 3,000-share provision. Allowing an Incorporator’s
successor to now enforce the 3,000-share provision would prejudice parties like Carlson
and his predecessors who have relied on the existence of Minnie Maud for over a century.
The Articles state that “it is intended that [Minnie Maud] shall succeed to the
property rights of [the Incorporators] in the waters and ditches and canals of Minnie
Maud Creek.” [R2 000803.] The Articles also state that Minnie Maud “does hereby
purchase, take, receive, and hold all of the water rights now held and claimed by the
several incorporators . . . together with all canals, dams, locks, gates and weirs used
therewith . . . now owned and claimed by the individual incorporators hereto.” [R2
000805.]

These same Incorporators immediately commenced working together to

improve and expand the water delivery mechanisms owned by Minnie Maud.
[Addendum D, R2 000843-44, 000988, 001664.] And they ultimately built a reservoir,
which they operated and maintained until it was washed out in 1911 or 1913.
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[Addendum D, R2 000843-44.]

During construction of the new reservoir, the

Incorporators executed the Deed, which conveyed “all their and each of their rights and
claims of every kind . . . in and to the waters of Minnie Maud Creek . . . unto the [Minnie
Maud] and its assigns forever.” [Addendum D, R2 001447.] From 1903 to 1905, the
Incorporators participated in a lawsuit and appeal to this Court to protect their interests in
Minnie Maud Creek, with Minnie Maud as the named plaintiff. Minnie Maud Res. & Irr.
Co. v. Grames, 81 P. 893, 893 (Utah 1905) [R2 001043-47]. Between 1902 and 1955,
the Incorporators and their successor shareholders held and took record of corporate
meetings. [Addendum E, R2 000909-913, 001454-58, 001664.] And indeed, one of
EnerVest’s own predecessors-in-interest wrote a letter on Aug. 1, 1962 to the State
Engineer as part of the General Adjudication and affirmatively represented that he was
one of Minnie Maud’s directors, and that he and his brother owned shares in the
company. [Addendum F, R1 4130.]
EnerVest lines up those facts and characterizes them as giving rise to an equally
plausible inference that “[t]hese are the acts of incorporating, not the acts of waiving the
terms and conditions of the express agreement to incorporate.” (Aplt. Br. at 27 (emphasis
added); see also id. at 14 (“Far from waiving the Share Requirement, the only express
inference the Deed supports is the intention to start to comply with the Articles and the
Share Requirement.” (emphasis in original)).

EnerVest’s inference, however, is not

plausible based on the undisputed facts. “[W]hile an appellant who is challenging a
summary judgment entered against it is entitled to all favorable inferences, it is not
entitled to build a case on the gossamer threads of whimsy, speculation and conjecture.”
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JENCO LC v. Perkins Coie LLP, 2016 UT App 140, ¶ 15 (quotation marks and
alterations omitted).

“[U]nsubstantiated conclusions and opinions are inadmissible.”

Cabaness v. Thomas, 2010 UT 23, ¶ 33, 232 P.3d 486, 498. A plaintiff cannot avoid
summary judgment based on doubtful, vague, speculative or inconclusive evidence.
Heslop v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 2017 UT 5, ¶ 21, ___ P.3d ___; see also Kranendonk
v. Gregory & Swapp, PLLC, 2014 UT App 36, ¶ 15, 320 P.3d 689 (“A reasonable
inference exists when there is at least a foundation in the evidence upon which the
ultimate conclusion is based, while in the case of speculation, there is no underlying
evidence to support the conclusion.” (quotations omitted)).
Said differently, EnerVest would have this Court agree that it is reasonable and
plausible that a group of Incorporators (1) wrote extensive Articles summarizing their
intent that Minnie Maud hold the Water Rights, (2) built the reservoir contemplated by
the Articles and maintained it for multiple years, (3) executed a formal deed conveying
the Water Rights to Minnie Maud “forever,” (4) appointed directors, had shareholder
meetings, hired a water master, pursued lawsuits, and generally acted like a going
concern for decades, (5) prosecuted a case to the Utah Supreme Court to quiet title to the
Water Rights in Minnie Maud, and (6) affirmatively represented to a state agency that
Minnie Maud still had directors and shareholders over 50 years later—but that all of these
facts could be explained as an intention to start the incorporation process, and that the
Incorporators did not intend for Minnie Maud to actually exist and hold the Water Rights
until 3,000 shares had been issued.

EnerVest’s argument exceeds the bounds of

plausibility. Its position would require the Court to ignore at least fifty years (from 1902
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to 1957), if not more, that indisputably establish Minnie Maud existed, owned the Water
Rights, and was never challenged by the original Incorporators.
The undisputed facts, even when viewed in the light most favorable to EnerVest,
support no other reasonable conclusion.

EnerVest attempts to inject its own

interpretation on the facts, but the evidence is all documentary based on decades-old
deeds, affidavits, court documents, corporate minutes, etc. There are no live witnesses.
All is long gone to dust. As such, the district court correctly limited its ruling to the
undisputed facts in the record and any reasonable inferences therefrom. The competing
speculations or unsupportable inferences proposed by EnerVest do not pass muster, and
the only reasonable inference to be drawn from these facts is, as concluded by the district
court, that the Incorporators intentionally waived the 3,000-share provision.
III.

ENERVEST’S ARGUED INCONSISTENCY WITH THE PROPOSED
DETERMINATION WAS NOT RAISED BELOW AND IS AN
INAPPROPRIATE EXPANSION OF THE SECTION 24 HEARING
EnerVest devotes ten pages in its Appellate Brief to explore its argument that “the

district court’s legal conclusion of waiver is inconsistent with the General Determination
and the PD.” (Aplt. Br. at 31, 31-42.) This argument, however, was never raised below
and is an improper attempt to expand the Section 24 hearing. Regardless, even if this
argument were before the Court, it fails to recognize the reality that virtually all water
companies own water rights for use on land not owned by the water company.
A. Failure to Preserve this Argument Below
“To properly preserve an issue for appellate review, the issue must be raised in the
district court,” including that it was “specifically raised, in a timely manner” and
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“supported by evidence and relevant legal authority.” Donjuan v. McDermott, 2011 UT
72, ¶ 20, 266 P.3d 839 (emphasis added).
Under the heading “Issue, Standard and Preservation,” EnerVest claims it
preserved its arguments in its memorandum in opposition to Carlson’s motion for
summary judgment [R2 001398-1400], its reply memorandum in support of its own
motion for summary judgment [R2 001620-22], and arguments raised during oral
argument [R2 002181, 002202-03]. (See Aplt. Br. at 2.) But nowhere in these citations
does EnerVest alert the district court that a ruling in favor of Carlson would be
inconsistent with the Proposed Determination.

Indeed, that argument was never

presented to the district court below and should be rejected as unpreserved.
B. Inappropriate Attempt to Expand the Scope of the Section 24 Hearing
EnerVest’s failure to argue inconsistency with the Proposed Determination below
is not surprising because the district court carefully circumscribed the scope of the
Section 24 Hearing to focus exclusively on the issue of whether the Proposed
Determination “was correct to list [Minnie Maud] as the owner of [the Water Rights].”
[R2 000477-79.]

In determining what appropriately belongs inside the General

Adjudication suit and what should be brought in a separate action, the Utah Supreme
Court has clearly stated “the only issues to be tried in a general adjudication are the rights
to the use of the water involved . . . . No provision appears to have been made for crossactions for any further or different relief than the determination of the rights.” Smith v.
District Court, 256 P. 539 (Utah 1927) (emphasis added). And a Section 24 Hearing,
which is just a mini-case within the General Adjudication, cannot be expanded beyond
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these limits. See United States Fuel Co. v. Huntington Irr. Co., 79 P.3d 945 (Utah 2003)
(discussing the relationship between Objections, Section 24 Hearings, and suits outside
the General Adjudication to resolve private claims).
EnerVest argues that Minnie Maud’s ownership of the Water Rights is
inconsistent with the Proposed Determination because water allocation along Minnie
Maud Creek should be dependent on irrigated acreage, which EnerVest claims is
inconsistent with proportionate share ownership. (Aplt. Br. at 35-39.) This argument
misses the mark.
First, it was never specifically raised in the Objections, and as such is beyond the
scope of the Section 24 Hearing.
Second, it is an attack on other aspects of the Proposed Determination that were
not before the district court. It is true that the Proposed Determination provides for
Minnie Maud ownership of the Water Rights but does not provide that all the Water
Rights can be used on all of the shareholders’ lands (i.e., the company’s service area).
Most water companies would prefer a service area approach to water allocation, but
neither Minnie Maud nor any other party objected to this aspect of the Proposed
Determination. EnerVest nevertheless invites this Court to analyze this aspect of the
Proposed Determination, prepared based on mapping completed long after-the-fact in
about 1964, to glean evidence of whether the Incorporators intended to waive the 3,000share provision in the early 1900s. Not only is an analysis of the authorized points of
diversion and places of use in the Proposed Determination wholly irrelevant to the issue
of the validity of the Deed, it represents an end-run to raise new objections to the
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Proposed Determination. Such arguments are untimely and not allowed. See Utah Code
Ann. § 73-4-11(2) (setting a 90-day time limit for raising objections).
And third, EnerVest’s argument fails to acknowledge that water rights can be
owned by one entity, but authorized for use only on another owner’s land. For example,
a water right used under a lease is often owned by one person but used on land owned by
a separate person. Furthermore, mutual irrigation companies are typically the record
owners of water rights, even though the companies themselves typically hold none of the
lands on which the water is authorized for use. This is exactly the case here. Minnie
Maud, as owner of the Water Rights, need not have ever owned the land on which the
Water Rights were used. The Proposed Determination’s identification of aspects other
than ownership of particular Water Rights is not before the Court, and, regardless, the
determination of Minnie Maud as the owner of the Water Rights is dependent on the
chain of title, not the results of a 1960s survey.
IV.

ALTERNATIVE GROUNDS EXIST TO AFFIRM THE DISTRICT
COURT’S RULING.
The district court decided the case based upon its conclusion that the Incorporators

waived compliance with the 3,000-share provision of the Articles, and did not reach
Carlson’s alternative arguments regarding of laches and estoppel. (MIS Carlson’s Mot.
S.J., R2 001009-11.) But this Court can affirm the district court’s decision on “any legal
ground or theory apparent on the record.” Bailey, 2002 UT 58, ¶ 10.
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A. The Doctrine of Laches Bars EnerVest from Challenging Minnie Maud’s
Authority to Receive and Own the Water Rights
The right to enforce a contractual condition can expire under the doctrine of
laches. See, e.g., Nilson-Newey & Co. v. Utah Resources Intern., 905 P.2d 312, 314
(Utah Ct. App. 1995) (holding that contractual right to obtain distribution or accounting
was unavailable based on a twenty-year delay). Generally, the doctrine of laches serves
the “maxim that equity aids the vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights.”
Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Horne, 2012 UT 66, ¶ 29,
289 P.3d 502 (internal quotation marks omitted).

In Utah a party must prove two

elements to establish laches: “(1) the “lack of diligence” on the part of claimant and (2)
an injury to respondent “owing to such lack of diligence.” Id. ¶ 29 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
As a matter of law, the doctrine of laches bars EnerVest from now challenging
Minnie Maud’s authority to own the Water Rights. The following facts, each of which
were not disputed, establish the applicability of laches:

(1) in April 1902, the

incorporators were each mentioned by name in the Articles of Incorporation, which noted
how many shares each person was issued, [R2 000802]; (2) the incorporators constructed,
maintained, and used water delivery structures, including a reservoir in which they stored
the water from Minnie Maud Creek for the benefit of the Incorporators, [Addendum D,
R2 000843-44, 000988, 001664]; (3) in May 1902, the incorporators each signed and
executed the deed conveying “all their and each of their rights and claims of every kind
. . . in and to the waters of Minnie Maud Creek . . . unto the Minnie Maud Reservoir and
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Irrigation Company and its assigns forever,” [Addendum D, R2 001447]; (4) from 1903
through 1905, they participated in a lawsuit under the name of Minnie Maud [R2 001043,
001663-64];

(5)

between

1902

and

1955,

the

incorporators

and

their

successor shareholders held and took records of corporate meetings [R2 001664]; and
(6) there is no evidence that anyone asserted Minnie Maud’s purported nonexistence
between 1902 and 1957—a period of 55 years. [See generally R1 and R2; see also T. F.
Housekeeper’s Ans. to Compl., at R2 001317 (May 23, 1957) (asserting Minnie Maud’s
nonexistence for the first time).]
EnerVest cannot now pursue decades-old claims. If EnerVest or its predecessors
wished to assert ownership of the Water Rights based on Minnie Maud’s issuing only
2,377 shares, they were obliged to do so far sooner than 1957. The predecessors’ failure
to raise this issue for more than 55 years is more than sufficient to satisfy the lack of
diligence element. And there is no evidence in the record, either directly or through
inference, that could establish EnerVest or its predecessors didn’t sleep on their rights for
more than half a century. If courts did not apply laches to such a great length of time,
“there would be no limitation whatever, and property would be thrown into confusion.”
Bowman v. Wathen, 42 U.S. 189, 194 (1843) (noting laches was founded on the principle
that equitable claims “must be acted upon, at the utmost, within twenty years.”
(quotations omitted)). EnerVest’s “predecessors have slumbered on their rights,” Insight
Assets, Inc. v. Farias, 2013 UT 47, ¶ 22, and equity bars their decades-old challenge, see
id. (concluding laches barred a party from asserting a three-year-old claim).
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Moreover, this lack of diligence indisputably results in an injury to Minnie Maud’s
shareholders. The original incorporators agreed to receive water deliveries in proportion
to their stock ownership. [See Articles, R2 000805-06.] They conveyed all of their
canals, locks, damns, gates, and weirs to Minnie Maud, to be shared in proportion to their
share ownership. [Id.] They agreed to work as a collective to build and maintain more
water delivery structures. [Id.] Since that time, Minnie Maud’s shares were treated as
having value in proportion to their ownership of the Water Rights, and both Carlson and
his predecessors bought and sold those shares based on that value. EnerVest’s attempt to
rescind this century-old agreement will result in injury to Minnie Maud’s shareholders by
stripping them of their rightful position as owners of the Water Rights, and would injure
their ability to receive and use the water authorized by those rights.
As a matter of law under the undisputed facts, even drawn in the light most
favorable to EnerVest, by failing to timely enforce or even raise the 3,000-share
provision of the Articles for more than 55 years (from 1902 to 1957), EnerVest and its
predecessors are barred from pursuing that claim now. Thus, the Court has more than
adequate grounds to affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the
alternative basis of laches.
B. Estoppel Precludes EnerVest from Challenging Minnie Maud’s Authority
to Receive and Own the Water Rights
A related principle—if not identical when applied in this context—is that of
estoppel. Estoppel has broad application and many definitions. For example, “equitable
estoppel” is defined as (1) a “failure to act by one party inconsistent with a claim later
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asserted.” (2) “reasonable action or inaction by the other party” based on the first party’s
failure to act, and (3) injury to the second party . . . from allowing the first party to
contradict or repudiate such . . . failure to act.” Youngblood v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co.,
2007 UT 28, ¶14, 158 P.3d 1088 (internal quotation marks omitted). Another definition
is “quasi-estoppel,” which “precludes a party from asserting, to another’s disadvantage, a
right inconsistent with a position [it has] previously taken.” In re RBFS, 2012 UT App
132, ¶ 31, 278 P.3d 143 (quotations omitted); cf. Harding v. Indus. Comm’n of Utah, 83
Utah 376, 28 P.2d 182, 184-85 (1934) (noting the principle of “quasi estoppel,” and
concluding a litigant was estopped from making certain arguments). The quasi-estoppel
doctrine “applies when it would be unconscionable to allow a person to maintain a
position inconsistent with one to which he acquiesced.” In re RBFS, 2012 UT App 132, ¶
31. Quasi-estoppel does not require proof of reliance by the party asserting it. See Smith
v. DenRoss Contracting, U.S., Inc., 737 S.E.2d 392, 399 (N.C. App. 2012).
But no matter the definition of estoppel, the core “doctrine of estoppel applies
where a person undertakes to deny as true that which she has by her solemn acts and
daily conduct over a long period of years avowed as true.” Tanner v. Provo Reservoir
Co., 289 P. 151, 154 (Utah 1930) (quotations omitted). Thus, courts have held that
“parties may, by their agreements or conduct, estop themselves from denying the
existence of the corporation.” Am. Vending Servs., Inc. v. Morse, 881 P.2d 917, 920
(Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Based on the undisputed facts, EnerVest should be estopped from now objecting
to Minnie Maud’s ownership of the Water Rights. Over a century ago, in 1902, the
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Incorporators executed a deed conveying the Water Rights to Minnie Maud. [Addendum
D, R2 001447.] Soon thereafter, they appointed a board, which held meetings, appointed
a water master, and levied assessments. [Addendum E, R2 000909-913, R2 001454-58
(indicating the Board of Directors appointed likely EnerVest predecessor J.C. Johnston as
water master for $100 per year).]

In 1903, the Incorporators participated in and

acquiesced to the Grames lawsuit in which Minnie Maud defended its claim of ownership
over the Water Rights [R2 001304-15], and they continued to acquiesce to Minnie
Maud’s role until the Utah Supreme Court issued its 1905 Grames decision affirming the
district court, Minnie Maud Res. & Irr. Co. v. Grames, 81 P. 893, 893 (Utah 1905) [R2
001043-47]. Indeed, D.C. Johnston (misstated as Johnson in the opinion), another likely
EnerVest predecessor, testified on behalf of Minnie Maud in Grames. Id. at 894.
EnerVest and the Objectors did not present a single document or other piece of
admissible evidence to the district court indicating that an original Incorporator ever
disputed Minnie Maud’s existence or ownership of the Water Rights, and no successor to
the Incorporators raised the issue until 1957. (R2 001317.) Finally, EnerVest’s own
predecessor, Thomas A. Christensen, treated Minnie Maud as a valid entity when he
wrote a letter dated Aug. 1, 1962, in which he affirmatively represented to the State
Engineer that Minnie Maud had officers and had issued stock. [Addendum F, R1 4130.]
He identified himself as one of those officers, and went on to identify himself and his
brother (Bud Christensen) as shareholders. [Id.]
Those undisputed facts demonstrate that EnerVest’s predecessors treated Minnie
Maud as being a valid and existing entity. Therefore, as a matter of law, EnerVest cannot
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now claim Minnie Maud's nonexistence where its predecessors did not do so for at least
fifty-five years from 1902 to 1957. When shareholders "have dealt with the corporation
since its organization, and have recognized its powers and acquiesced in the exercise
thereof for a large number of years, they are estopped from questioning in such a
proceeding as this the rightful existence of the corporation." Marsh v. Mathias, 56 P.
1074, 1075 (Utah 1899).

EnerVest's predecessor "recognized the organization as a

corporation in business dealings," and anyone claiming a successive interest "should not
be allowed to quibble." See Am. Vending Servs., 881 P .2d at 923.
Thus, the Court has more than adequate grounds to affirm the district court's grant
of summary judgment on the alternative basis of estoppel.
CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, Carlson respectfully requests that this Court
affirm the district court's grant of his motion for summary judgment.
DATED this 18th day of January, 2016.
PARR BROWN GEE & LOVELESS, P .C.
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Minnie Maud Articles of Incorporation Filed (Tab 1)

April 11, 1902

Minnie Maud Certificate of Incorporation Issued by Utah Secretary of State (Tab 2)
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Incorporators Convey Water Rights to Minnie Maud by Deed (Tab 3)
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May 4, 1957

March 1964
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Minnie Maud Reservoir and Delivery System is Completed (Anderson Aff. - Tab 5)
Utah Supreme Court Affirms MM Decree (Tab 6)
Minnie Maud Dam Washes Out (Tab 5)

Lawsuit Filed Regarding Minnie Maud Water Rights (Tab 8)

Proposed Determination Issued (Tab 8)
Objections Filed (Tab 9)

November 9, 1974

Certificate of Dissolution Issued for Minnie Maud (Tab 10)

February 28, 2012

EnerVest Files Petition for Expedited Review of Objections

Minnie Maud Operation (Tab 7)
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.and we boys worked on the farm and biad some livestock that we run in
the area. My father purchased the rranlt warren relinquishn\ent on the
homestead, ho then 'homeateaded 160 acres wbicb we lived on and he proved
up on,Sy the enCl of 19021 We had broken up and werG faming approxi•
mately 20 acres of land. Approximately 16 acroe was bel01' the road
and approJd.Jlllltely 4 acres above the rOBd. The present road is in about
the same location as it was in 1902.

we continued to live on the farm and I left 1n the fall of
Ml' father sold out the place to crawford and Monk of Manti ili
1912 and my father left tho area at that time.
1911.

I waa 1n th& area in 1902 and heard the 11\en on Minnie Maud
tallc about the water prol:>lema and 1dm fuming m the Minn10 Maud
IrrifaUon ~. 'l'hia company \fa& organized in 1902 for the main

creek

purpose of building a reservoir on the creek to increase the W&ter
supply. Bel Lee '11l8 tbe m11in 1n.atig&tor of the organization and toolt
an active part in it. As I recall, my father received 39 shares in
tha 1rri9atian company. I am not sure What the axact basis was for the

num))er of shares tbllt each water user too~, but as ca CJ&DBral proposi~ion
the ah.ares that they were to receive in the COJDpany was baaed upon the
number of acres that they irrigated at that time in Minnie Maud creek
plus water they oxpac:ted to get from the reservoir. 1'he plan was to
put in tim and lal>or and teams and scrapers and build the reservoir ·
themselves an4 in this way increase the amount of water I.that would be
avai~lo during the farming season.
1 am not fW!liliar with the amount
of stodc that ~rs owned other than my father received in the irri"'
gation company.
·
Right after the company was organised all the water users on
»lin.nie Mau4 creek wont to work with hand tools, teams and aero.para to
build the reservoir up Minnie Maud canyon just above the ~eaent Gane
Anderson place. ~ brother and I worked on this reservoir for a couple
of years. 1 remember that B4 I.Se had two or three teams and s=apera
workinCJ on this reservoir ~t times. Bone of us worked continuously,
w just put in time on the reservoir ~en we had time available. Thia
reservoir site was a natural bilsin and did not require a great amount of
fill. we made a clltch frona Minnie Naud creelt higher up to lead water
wan it was available into the reservoir. · wa placed in a head gate on
the side of the reservoir that was closeat to Minnie Maud Creek. Thia
vaa a wooden head gate with a steel plate or gate that hAd a large nut
oia th" top that you tuned with a wrench.
KY father made the head gate
and shaped the steol that vent into the gate. I was present when this
was done. '1be res~ir was OOIQPleted in tvo or three years Whid\ would
be &))out 1905 and water waa stored in it. I remenal>er on one occasion
at leaet that B4 Lee aalctad me and Pred Grames to go up to the reservoir
and turn water down to him for bis tum. we took with ua a large wrac:h
thllt waul4 fit this nut on tbe top of the gate and I remember we
dropped it in thG water and had to dive into the water of the reservoir
to get the urenc:h badt.

There were some years that th.are wasn•t enough hi~ water
availal>le to atore in tbs reservoir, other years the reservoir' had water
in it and some years U: was full. This reservoir continud to bold
water watil around 1911 or 1913, I cannot remember the ™ct year,
around tbis time, the dam washed out and vas never repaired an.cl the
000843

.

,

reoervou never held any more water until it was reatoraa by &be:ddan
Powall 1n the 1940s.
I Clon't know the number of am:G feet. that thia reseJ:VOir
held. It vas not a larqe reservoir. l have frequently been oat. to
Sina 1$11e, the last time was about tbrea ysara ago and I have aeen tbe
reaenoir that Shoddan Powa1l has constructed. lb:. ~ll •a resarvoir ie thGt eama one that we atartea building in 1902, 1s in the same
location Wl4 has the same capacity.

Around 1902 and 1903 I beard the water users on Rinnl'll Maud
·creeJc,and especially Mr. Lee, talk about buildinCJ other reservoirs ..
They diacuased building a reservoir at ld\at. was referred to as the
BeaVer V&lleyo This location ·would be nine or ten mil&s up Minnie
Naud CAQyOn from where Minnie Maud comes into Dine M1leo The other
:w:eeenoir was alx»ut aix·muea up thie eams canyon. This Beaver Valley
reservoir never cl:l.d materiaU.ze. 'l'hers was nave: any work done on it.
As to the operation of the Minnie .Maud Irrigation Compw\y I
of no stockholders me.atinqs or directors meetings that they eve~
held while I was still there. The irrigation CQD\PB.QY never had a
water nwJter and all the water users too~ their own wat~ from their
own glac:ea of a1version and this water was never regulated or contro,J.led
by the irr19ation ~. After I left the area in the fall of 1911
I don't know what was done ill this reBpect.
lcnow

Moat of the people tholt wore in that area around 1902 have died.
TherQ la a Mrs. Westwood that. lived on the David Russell place that is
now owned :by Sheridan Powell . I believe she is still alive but I
don't 'know her address.

1963.

llit Coom:u;~•

subscribed and sworn to before me this

t::,!: . , 11.J'<~ 6. 194'

!t,.:.J '"<•. P1::, t :·:J.

~day

of August,

tl~~&u~

Reeiding at•~~~~~~~~~~-----

My Commission Bsp1resa
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Addendum F
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Price Utah,A.ug l 1962
Mr.!Dlrold Don•ldson
State Engineers O~fioe
Room 442 State Capitol Bl4g.
~alt ta.lee City Utah.
Dear Sirt Following ia the list of Offloera of the Minnie

Kand Irrigation Go.

E.EJ>aYia
President
~td Huoakeeper Vioe Pres •
. Glen 'A llred
Direo tor
T•.l.Chrtateaaen
011Te Davia Sea•

11

•

Following 18 the list of Stookholdera and the &mOWlt of stock
owned by each,
Ernest E.DaTis Jro (Glen Allred) l,429 Shares
~T.A.Obriatenaen ~

'.. B\ld Christensen
!re4 Ko\18keepar
L·o uis Jlo tte

899

1/.2

,, (

19 i'/2 '.'

. 260

68
i9
182

Bernard Iriat
Amber ICeel

399 Shares

'!~·

·n
It

Tota1!~3'11

Rope this will be ot uae to You , I am
Your truly
!.A..Chriatens'ea ·
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Addendum G

The Order of Court is stated below:
Dated: June 20, 2014
/s/ SAMUEL P CHIARA
08:17:21 AM
District Court Judge
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